New Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policies and the Enlargement of the Eurozone
The work with this study has been extensive as well as exciting. Help, support and encouragement from several persons have promoted the completion of this work. First of all, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Michael Bolle for his inimitable way of teaching and guiding me in my quest to reach a thorough understanding of knowledge and science, and for his valuable comments during the creation of this thesis. Likewise, I thank my secondary supervisor Prof. Dr. Gerald Schneider for his thoughtful insights,Prof.Dr.CarstenHelm forhis willingnessto discusstheinitial ideas of my game-theoretic models and Jan Ru ¨bel and Vera Troger ¨ for discussing further mathematical issues with me. I am very grateful to my colleagues (and former fellow-travellers) at the Jean Monnet Centre of Excellence. Special thanks go to Achim Kemmerling with whom I have shared an o?ce during the last few years. This time has proven to be an estimable symbiotic relationship. Thanks also to Shana Mo?ett-Heyder for helping me with my English. This work has bene?ted greatly from my collaboration within the research project “The Eastward Enlargement of the Eurozone”(Ezo- plus). Many ideas in this thesis have been developed as a result of that collaboration. Financial and furthersupporthave been provided by the DFG-Graduate College “The New Europe”andthe Berlin Graduate School of Social Sciences. At last, I thank Do ¨rte Nedderhut for her love, understanding, and patience—patience is a virtue.
Examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the eastward expansion of the eurozoneDescribes the altered exchange-rate policy that is carried out utilizing a "threaten-thy-neighbour" strategyArgues that the consequent bargaining game results in a robust outcome