Meta-Ethics, Moral Objectivity and Law
The book shows the relevance of meta-ethical and metaphysical considerations to determine the nature of law and the connection between objective moral and legal judgements. The investigation analyses the legal theories of Ronald Dworkin, Jurgen Habermas and Michael Moore.
The conclusion of the scrutiny is that the discussed views fail to explain the plausible links between objective moral and legal judgements. The lesson to learn from the failure of these philosophical perspectives is that we need to revise fundamental meta-ethical conceptions within law. In addition to the view that meta-ethical and metaphysical considerations play a central role in our understanding of objective moral and legal judgements, we enforce the idea that it is necessary to revise our meta-ethical and metaphysical premises in jurisprudence. Epistemic and meta-ethical abstinence in legal theory, in this way, is challenged by a number of criticisms. Finally, we argue that it is necessary to establish the limits of our contemporary debate, without sacrificing fundamental notions such as truth and objectivity. The outcome of our reflection is that in legal theory, as in many other disciplines, we need to take truth and objectivity seriously.
born 1966 in Caracas, Venezuela, studied Logic and Philosophy of Science in Caracas, and Law in Oxford and Cambridge (PhD 2000). Since 2001 she is Lecturer in the School of Law at the University of Birmingham, UK. Her research interests lie in the fields of legal, moral and political philosophy.